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THE BOr.-18 IN SPAIN 
(1) QUESTION: Have you lost a nuclear bomb? 
ANSWER: There were several unarmed nuclear weapons aboard the U. S. 
B-52 bomber which crashed January 17, 1966, at Palomares in Spain. One of those 
weapons has not yet been located. 
(2) QUESTION: How many bombs were involved in all? 
ANSWER: Four. 
(3) QUESTION: Were they nuclear or thermonuclear weapons? 
ANSWER: Thermonuclear. 
(4) QUESTION: Did any of them explode? 
ANSWER: If you mean whether there was a nuclear explosion, the answer 
is emphatically no. Two of the weapons experienced nonnuclear, TNT-type explo-
sions on impact with the ground. This resulted in the scattering of plutonium 
(PU-239) and uranium (U-235) in a small area in the immediate vicinity of impact 
at most, 100 or 150 feet around the impact point. 
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I (5) QUESTION: Will the missing bomb go off? Will it cause radioactive l 
I contamination? 
ANSWER: Again, the answer to both questions, emphatically, is -- no. 
There is no reason for concern, either about a nuclear explosion or 
radioactivity. U. S. nuclear weapons contain safeguards designed expressly to 
prevent an accidental nuclear explosion. We have had no such explosion during 
our 20 years of handling nuclear weapons. Radioactivity from the missing 
weapon would pose no threat, even if the weapon broke up and some of the nuclear 
material were scattered. U. S. and Spanish scientists have determined that no 
health hazard exists as a result of the January 1966 accident. 
(6) QUESTION: If it is so safe, why are you hunting for the lost bomb? 
ANSWER: To recover the bomb, the design of which is highly classified; 
to recover other classified material, and also debris from the wreckage which 
may help analyze causes of the crash. 
(7) QUESTION: Is this the first crash of an aircraft with nuclear weapons 
aboard? 
ANSWER: No, there have been others -- and none has resulted in a 
nuclear explosion. 
The safety record of the U. S. nuclear weapons program has been excep-
tional in two ways: (a) accidents have been very few; (b) accidents with 
nuclear explosions have never happened, because highly reliable safety features 
have been designed into every weapon. The result has been a weapon so safe 
that accidental nuclear explosion is precluded even when the weapon is struck, 
dropped from great heights, or subjected to fire. The most that has ever 
happened -- and it happened in the crash in Spain -- is that a small part of 
the nuclear material in a bomb has been scattered over a small area. This 
material produces alpha radiation -- rays of very short range which cannot 
pierce skin, hence pose no threat of ttexternal radiation" (from outside the 
body) as do rays from a nuclear explosion. 
I 
(8) QU~STION: When and where were the previous crashes with nuclear 
\weapons aboard? 
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r--- ANSWER: There have been several such accidents since 1958, all l 
I publicly announced by the U. S. 
(9) QUESTION: 
broke up in Spain? 
What about the plutonium which was scattered when the bomb 
Isn't that terribly radioactive? 
ANSWER: Contrary to popular impression, alpha rays from plutonium 
cannot even penetrate the skin. Plutonium is a man-made element and its 
properties are very well known. In the form used in weapons it is a heavy, 
dark brown or black metal similar to lead. Alpha rays extend only a few centi-
meters in air and are stopped by any solid, such as tissue paper or skin, and 
plutonium can be safely held in the hand. There is thus no hazard from 
plutonium outside the body. 
It can be swallowed in small quantities with negligible hazard, since in 
weapons grade it is virtually insoluable and almost all of it quickly passes 
on out of the body. 
Taken into the lungs in large quantities, it can cause a hazard. However, 
plutonium scattering experiments in Nevada since 1957 showed that even if a 
person standing in a cloud of plutonium dust inhaled the material, it would 
result in a radiation dose to the lungs that is only about half the yearly 
amount permitted for all organs in the body of a U. S. atomic industry worker. 
This permissible dose level is prescribed in standards issued by the Inter-
national Commission on Radiation Protection, a group of scientists from a 
number of countries. 
The Nevada experiments tell us that hazardous levels of inhalation did 
not exist in Spain and are unlikely to exist in similar accidents. ~anish 
and U. s. scientists have explored all possibilitids of risk to health and 
they are convinced no health hazard occurred in this case. 
The properties of uranium, which was also present in the accident in 
Spain, are similar but even less potent. Metallic plutonium and uranium of 
the types used in weapons are completely different from "fission products" --
the products of a nuclear explosion or reaction -- which pose an external 
health hazard (from outside the body). The weapons materials are very heavy. 
Fragments settle to earth or sink in water rapidly, within a very limited area. 
If there were particles small enough to be suspended in water, they would soonj l be dispersed . 
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I ( 1 O) QUESTION: If plutonium and uranium are so safe, why did you make J 
!radiological surveys and buy up crops and farm animals in Spain, and why are you 
removing soil? 
ANSWER: Such measures are part of the standard, planned-in-advance 
emergency procedures in any accident involving nuclear armament. They are 
intended to go to the point of absolute assurance -- to take extra precautions 
on the safe side. U. S. standards are based on 11 lifetime11 exposures. This 
means that if a certain amount of radioactive material might be dangerous to a 
man living in it or working with it for a lifetime, we clean up and correct 
those conditions with a very large margin of safety in every case . 
(11) QUESTION : How do you know that the tomatoes, meat, and milk from the 
farms in the area of impact in Spain are not contaminated? 
ANSWER: We know this definitely, from repeated surveys made by 
leading Spanish and .American scientists at the site . All produce which could 
conceivably have been affected has been disposed of. The remainder shows no 
trace of radioactive material . There is no hazard whatever from consuming 
those farm products. In fact, Spaniards and Americans at the site have been 
eating them regularly , and the farmers have been moving their products to ma~ket 
again for some time . 
(12) QUESTION: What about the ocean water -- and the fish? 
ANSWER: Tests conducted on the sea water by U. S. scientists have 
f ailed to detect the slightest sign of radioactivity from this accident. Even 
if some small amount of the nuclear material were released into the water, it 
would form an insoluble compound that is heavy, and thus would sink to the 
bottom. Any particles small enough to be suspended in the water would be greatly 
dispersed and diluted amid masses of sea water, and hence would represent no 
health hazard. 
Tests on fish in the area have also been entirely negative -- no radio-
ac t ivity. This too is natural, since fish would not be likely to ingest the 
particles as food any more than they would pieces of iron . If a fish should 
accidentally swallow a particle, it would leave the body of the fish by natural 
elimination. Any material passing into its system through the gills would not 
affect the flesh of a fish, and scientists agree that no harmful amount would J 
temain. Thus eating fish caught in the area would not be a health hazard. 
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r---- (13) QUESTION: Was the accident in Spain a violation of the test ban l 
ltreaty, as the Soviet Union has charged? 
ANSWER: Of course not. This is far-fetched, even for a Soviet 
propagandist. The test ban treaty prohibits "any nuclear weapon test explosion, 
or any other nuclear explosion ••• 11 Since no nuclear explosion occurred in the 
Palomares incident, there was no treaty violation. 
(14) QUESTION: What about Soviet charges that the accident in Spain vio-
lated the 1958 11 open sea convention," prohibiting contamination of the oceans 
with radioactive materials? 
ANSWER: Again, propaganda without foundation. Not only was there no 
contamination of the ocean, as I have already pointed out (Question No. 9), 
but that treaty bears no relation at all to the crash. The article of the 
treaty from which the Soviets quoted out of context deals with (a) 11 the dumping 
of radioactive waste" and (b) cooperation with international organizations to 
prevent pollution. 
(15) QUESTION: Why do you endanger people by carrying nuclear weapons 
around in aircraft? 
ANSWER: No one has been endangered, and the U. S. precautions and 
safeguards against an accidental explosion have proven completely effective. 
Our flights are a function of the United States nuclear deterrent force, strongest 
in the world, which has helped prevent nuclear war or world war for the pa.st 
20 years. 
The U. s. force is constantly in readiness to protect our own people and 
all the people in countries allied with us. The main essential in preventing 
war is to be prepared, so U. S. missiles, planes, submarines, guns and men are 
ever ready. The result is that aggression can be deterred and war prevented L~ 
cases such as the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, when the Soviet Union tried to 
sneak nuclear missiles into Cuba as an aggressive threat to the U. s. .American 
superior strength, preparedness, r.1M9olve and restraint forced the Soviets to 
withdraw their missiles. 
L ( 16) QUESTION: Do you overfly my country with nuclear weapons? ANSWER: For _J 
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I ANSW'ER: For reasons of military security I cannot comment on this l 
jquestion. However, the people of all countries can be assured that the U. S. 
will never relax its concern with nuclear safety. 
(17) QUESTION: Doesn't flying around with nuclear weapons increase the 
chance of war by accident or misunderstanding? 
ANSWER: Quite the contrary. As I have explained (Question No. 15), 
airborne nuclear weapons are an important part of the U. S. nuclear war-preven-
tive deterrent. In addition to its successful program to avoid accidental 
nuclear explosions, the U. S. is the pioneer and foremost practitioner of 
devices and procedures to prevent outbreak of war by misunderstanding. 
President Johnson disclosed some specifics in September 1964: 
"We have worked consistently to bring nuclear weapons under careful control 
and to lessen the danger of nuclear conflicts, and this policy has been the 
policy of the United States of .America for 19 years now, under both Democratic 
and Republican administrations •••• The release of nuclear weapons would come by 
Presidential decision alone. Complex codes and electronic devices prevent any 
unauthorized action. Every further step along the way from decision to 
destruction is governed by the two-man rule. Two or more men must act indepen-
dently and must decide the order has been given. An elaborate system of checks 
and counterchecks, procedural and mechanical, guard against any unauthorized 
nuclear bursts. In addition, since 1961 we have placed permissive-action links 
on several of our weapons. These are electromechanical locks which must be 
opened by secret combination before action at all is possible, and we are 
extending this system. 11 
One of the checks to which the President referred is the well-known command 
control system, through which U. S. aircraft cannot proceed beyond a certain 
point without a positive, unmistakable command originating at the highest level 
of government. This "fail-safe" system has worked without flaw since its 
inception over a decade ago. Similar systems keep all U. s. nuclear deterrent 
systems under constant control -- including land-based and submarine-based 
long-range missiles. In addition to its own independent measures, the U. S. 
suggested and urged adoption of one quick method to reduce the risk of inter-
national misunderstandings in crises -- the "hot line" -- a constantly manned 
direct teletype link which was installed between Washington and Moscow in 1963. 
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[ (18) QUESTION: Do the Soviets overfly other countries with nuclear l weapons? 
ANSWER: You should ask them. They have given us no information 
about the safety features of their weapons. 
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